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MODELS FOR ANTITRUST 
The Allocation of Landing Rights by 
Unanimity Among Competitors 
By DAVID M. GRETHER, R. MARK ISAAC, AND CHARLES R. PLOTT* 
During the late 1960's, air congestion 
often involving long delays or "stacks" was 
common at major airports. The right to land 
and take off was allocated on a first-come, 
first-served basis with little coordination 
among scheduled carriers. Since 1968, the 
four major airports in the United States, 
La Guardia, Washington National, John 
F. Kennedy International, and O'Hare In- 
ternational, have been operating under a 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
high-density ruling which limits the number 
of slots (takeoffs and landings per hour) at 
each of these airports. 
Slots are allocated by scheduling commit- 
tees authorized by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB). The scheduling committee at 
each airport is comprised of one representa- 
tive from each airline certificated by the 
CAB to fly into that airport. The commit- 
tees usually meet semiannually, as organized 
and coordinated by the Air Transport As- 
sociation. Membership on the committees is 
relatively stable, with the same person usu- 
ally being on all committees on which a 
carrier has representation. 
The implications of the committee method 
of allocating airport capacity are a current 
policy concern. By 1985, as many as thirty- 
five airports may be facing serious access or 
capacity problems. In addition to runway, 
airspace, and environmental constraints, 
bottlenecks could be caused by loading 
facilities, baggage facilities, counter space, 
etc. Industry sources have advocated the 
committee process as a national solution to 
the associated allocation problems. 
An analysis of the committee process rele- 
vant to policymakers must overcome two 
difficulties. First, key data about flight and 
route profitability will not be released by 
the carriers. Second, because of recent 
changes, the performance of the process in 
the past cannot simply be extrapolated to 
the future. Prior to deregulation, entry was 
effectively blocked, so the committee needed 
only to coordinate a few large carriers with 
relatively stable shares. However, with de- 
regulation the committee must deal with 
entrants that seek to alter shares. 
In order to deal with these problems, we 
studied such data as are available, and 
attended four scheduling committee meet- 
ings. In addition, we conducted several series 
of laboratory experiments.' The committees 
studied made decisions using the same pro- 
cedures as do the scheduling committees. 
Substantial financial incentives were used to 
induce demand functions which had the 
same qualitative properties as are thought to 
characterize the demand functions for slots. 
The experimental work graphically dem- 
onstrates that the model upon which the 
analysis is based has empirical support. This 
type of evidence will probably be of little 
value to economists who already have con- 
siderable experience with the behavioral 
properties of a variety of allocation pro- 
cesses. The model is typical of those which 
are often applied, so most economists will 
not be surprised to see it work in a simple 
laboratory environment. Nevertheless, as 
committee processes sometimes have subtle 
properties, it does not hurt to check the 
reliability of the basic reasoning. Further- 
more, some decision makers may have no 
experience with game-theoretic models, and 
rely on instincts and general theories of a 
completely different sort. To the extent that 
they may have doubts about the generality *California Institute of Technology, University of Arizona, and California Institute of Technology, re- 
spectively. Financial support from the National Science 
Foundation and the Caltech Program of Enterprise and 
Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 For a more complete discussion see our earlier 
paper. 
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of the economic models, additional experi- 
ments can always be conducted which in- 
corporate the variables of their concern. 
I. The Model 
The model applied to evaluate the com- 
mittee process is the core of a cooperative 
unanimity voting game without side pay- 
ments. Game-theoretic models seem to pro- 
vide the appropriate tools. It seems fair to 
say that members of the committee are ag- 
gressive defenders of their companies' inter- 
ests and view the committee as a com- 
plicated bargaining process in which they 
apply all their negotiation skills. The value 
of a slot during peak hours could be worth 
hundreds of dollars a day. Members of the 
committee are generally individuals with im- 
portant management positions within their 
companies and most have several years ex- 
2 perience on the committee. Evidence of 
strategic maneuvers is abundant. 
The rule of unanimity captures much of 
the essence of the committee procedures. 
While the procedures used by the committee 
were not detailed in the order creating the 
committees, members were told to reach an 
"'agreement." This has been interpreted as a 
basic rule of unanimity. In the past, the 
committee3 has always achieved unanimity 
and the FAA has always approved the deci- 
sion. Aside from the rule of unanimity, the 
committee has adopted additional proce- 
dures. Prior to each meeting the members 
submit their requests for slots to the com- 
mittee staffs. Not surprisingly, requests for 
slots usually exceed the FAA quotas at least 
for peak periods of the day. Most of the 
meeting is spent in discussions among car- 
riers and with the chair, which result in 
reducing the number of requests to equal 
the number of slots available. "Sliding," a 
procedure whereby a carrier moves a re- 
quest for operation from one hour to 
another, frequently occurs. Hypothetical 
"exercises" are often used, with carriers con- 
strained to the individual totals of some 
previous (typically the last) meeting or some 
other hypothetical schedule. Exercises, when 
complete, are usually a feasible solution 
which can serve as a basis for further discus- 
sion or a proposal to be voted on. 
The institutional structures of the com- 
mittees are designed to prevent side pay- 
ments and generally induce a voting nature 
to the allocation process as opposed to a 
market nature. The committees are exempt 
from antitrust laws. Nevertheless, concern 
about potential anticompetitive effects of 
the committee operations led the CAB to 
limit the scope of the committees' activi- 
ties. Each scheduling committee meeting is 
limited to discussions about slot allocations 
at a single airport for a fixed period of time. 
Discussions of city-pairs, scheduled fares, 
profitability, and other general aspects of 
airline competition are explicitly prohibited. 
Thus, for example, a committee member in 
the process of bargaining for an additional 
slot may not mention the intended destina- 
tion or point of origin. These restrictions 
make it difficult if not impossible for the 
airlines to trade slots either across the high 
density airports or over time. Side conversa- 
tions can take place but the public nature of 
the bargaining situation would make any 
"under-the-counter" sales of slots difficult. 
Carriers have no property rights in slots and 
do not have the contractual authority to 
make sales or trades. Carrier A may be 
willing to pay carrier B for slots, but if B 
were to reduce its slots, some other carrier 
(not A) may end up with them through the 
committee process. Thus, the institutional 
features suggest a game without side pay- 
ments. 
In all such models the core of the game 
is substantially influenced by the conse- 
quences of default-the option that would 
prevail if the committee failed to reach an 
agreement. No carrier would accept an al- 
location which it prefers less than the de- 
fault option (sometimes called the "threat 
2Clearly this has implications for the cost of this 
process. Meetings are held twice a year with all repre- 
sentatives present, and last about one week although 
time required has been increasing. A full four weeks 
were required in 1979 and most of this time was used in 
dealing with O'Hare and Washington National. 
3The Washington National scheduling committee 
defaulted in the fall, 1980, while this paper was in 
press. A "temporary" allocative decision was made by 
the FAA and the CAB. 
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point" in game theory). Each member has 
the power to "block" group action and force 
the committee into default. Therefore, the 
final outcome must be at least as good as 
the default option for all members of the 
committee. 
Should the committee fail to reach agree- 
ment, the decision would rest with the FAA. 
The procedure the FAA would use in the 
event of a default has not been decided. 
Four possibilities for allocating slots have 
been discussed: 1) a lottery; 2) an auction; 
3) grandfathering slots according to histori- 
cal patterns; 4) an administrative process of 
reviewing applications and applying some 
formula. No indication has been given by 
the FAA of its preference among these op- 
tions, but carriers are not indifferent. The 
higher the likelihood that the FAA would 
grandfather slots, the less large established 
carriers would fear default. The higher the 
likelihood of a lottery or of the FAA giving 
slots to potential entrants, the less potential 
entrants would fear default. 
II. Allocative Implications 
An important implication of the model 
introduced above is that the allocations of 
slots within the committee processes are 
sensitive to the regulatory political climate. 
The consequences of default depend upon 
the decisions of the FAA which will cer- 
tainly depend on the political climate at the 
time of default. Thus, the evaluations of the 
default option which are crucial from a re- 
source allocation perspective depend in part 
upon political considerations. 
A. Efficiency Properties of Committee 
Decisions 
Allocations which result from committees 
using procedures such as those used by the 
slot committees need not be economically 
efficient allocations. The primary variable 
which guides the committee decision is the 
threat point (consequences of default), and 
given its determinants, the outcomes will be 
economically efficient only by accident. This 
general conclusion applies both at the inde- 
pendent committee level and at the "sys- 
tems" level. 
1. Efficiency at the Single Committee Level 
The pattern has been for the new carriers 
to receive a few slots at the expense of 
carriers with a large allocation of slots. Aside 
from this small allocation at the time of 
entry, individual carriers have experienced 
little growth. This is understandable. Sup- 
pose the grandfather policy was adopted. 
The model predicts that expansion or entry 
could only take place if the historical time- 
of-day pattern was so inefficient that some 
carriers would prefer to give up a few slots 
to entrants rather than forego the gains from 
trade that an entrant-induced fault would 
cause. Thus, for practical purposes, entry 
and expansion would be prevented. Alterna- 
tively, if a lottery were adopted, carriers 
could anticipate only the expected value of 
the lottery. Presumably this would be the 
number of slots divided by number of re- 
quests where "requests" are subject to some 
review to avoid the obvious unbounded 
strategy. Without further qualifications this 
would mean that each carrier would expect 
the same number of slots. The slot commit- 
tee would thus unanimously choose equal 
division with the largest holders forced to 
"give up" slots to smaller firms and en- 
trants. 
This pattern is easily seen in the experi- 
mental research. Eight (fourteen member) 
and ten (nine member) committee experi- 
ments were conducted with the grandfather 
default rule. The "historical shares" of slots 
across members ranged from 0 to 8 with a 
total of 32 and 28 units to allocate, respec- 
tively. Deviations of committee allocations 
from historical shares averaged only .74 slots 
per individual per meeting and all of this is 
"large" holders giving up a few slots to very 
small holders. By comparison, three four- 
teen-member committees were studied un- 
der identical parametric conditions with the 
exception that a lottery rule would be used 
upon default. All participants received either 
two or three slots (expected value 2.5) which 
is exactly the case when agents are risk 
neutral. Average deviation from historical 
share was 1.76 slots per member per meet- 
ing. 
4Using the lottery and eight grandfather experi- 
ments with identical parameters, one gets X2(6) = 22.6, 
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The current situation is probably some 
mixture of these two. Thus, the largest firms 
should be unable to expand. In fact, the 
largest holders should give up slots to en- 
trants. Entrants should obtain slots until 
they become dubious about the default op- 
tion providing them with a reasonable ex- 
pectation of more. 
Again the pattern is evident in the data 
from the controlled environment commit- 
tees. Because the initial allocations need not 
be related to profitability, those who should 
expand cannot. In the controlled environ- 
ment committees, there were individuals in 
each size class that should have grown con- 
siderably. Growth was never achieved for 
large participants and large growth was never 
achieved by smaller, nonentrant participants 
where efficiency demanded it. Entry was 
always small and unrelated to underlying 
profitability. 
Inefficient carriers should contract in size. 
Certainly operations should not be trans- 
ferred from more profitable applications to 
less. Yet the latter is what can happen within 
committee processes. In the experiments, for 
example, individuals who should have re- 
ceived no slots according to economic 
criteria always got them from the committee 
if the default consequences were favorable. 
Economics suggests discrimination among 
entrants. High-cost carriers should not be 
granted scarce slots and enter the market 
when carriers with lower costs can enter or 
expand. Committee decisions on entry and 
exit do not follow this principle. There will 
be no exit since carriers whose operations 
should be replaced by other carriers have no 
incentive to relinquish their slots. There will 
also be no discrimination among potential 
entrants based upon their relative efficiency. 
All entrants have equal power to default the 
committee and jeopardize the slots of those 
who have had many. Thus, with the com- 
mittee, all potential entrants can "get in." 
The experience of the controlled environ- 
ment committees conforms to these predic- 
tions. 
Given a threat point, any allocation pro- 
cess should exhaust "gains from trade." 
Generally speaking, the existing procedures 
are capable of dealing with that aspect of 
the coordination problem. The sliding oper- 
ations systematically exploit the gains from 
trade from carriers trading operations at 
various times of day. The procedures are so 
natural that many controlled-environment 
committees initiated sliding operations even 
in the absence of their formal introduction. 
For the case of a grandfather default rule, 
efficiencies of committees that did not de- 
fault always increased over the initial alloca- 
tions in spite of inefficient entrants. 
The sliding process does have problems. 
The gains from trade between two parties 
can be prohibited by a third member (by 
virtue of the unanimity rule). Thus, a mem- 
ber who recognizes that two other members 
wish to trade can use the threat of veto 
to gain concessions. Committee members 
clearly recognized this possibility in con- 
trolled-environment committees, and it ap- 
pears that members of the scheduling com- 
mittees also do. 
2. System Level Efficiency 
The problem of efficiency goes beyond a 
single airport. The value to a carrier of a 
slot at one airport vill generally depend 
upon the other airports to which the carrier 
has access. For example, consider carriers 
entering a market. At a minimum this in- 
volves two airports, but because of joint 
costs and scale economies, entry into a 
"market" will frequently involve several air- 
ports. The allocation of slots within the sys- 
tem should be responsive to these inter- 
dependencies. The interdependencies among 
airports are clearly recognized by committee 
members. 
The opportunity for some coordination 
across high-density airports does exist. Even 
though discussion of city-pairs is explicitly 
precluded by the initial order, references are 
made to other meetings. Furthermore, the 
meetings for different airports are often 
convened "back-to-back." Nevertheless the 
process does not seem to deal efficiently 
with the interdependencies. An excellent ex- 
ample occurred recently when TWA was 
willing to give up slots at O'Hare in order to 
increase its slots at National. United was 
interested in a "trade," but when other car- 
which is highly significant. For this analysis, classes are 
defined by historical shares. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 13:58:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
170 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MA Y 1981 
riers heard slots at O'Hare might be "re- 
leased," the requests for additional slots 
there increased accordingly and no deal was 
made. 
The nature of the problem is easily iden- 
tified in the behavior of controlled-envi- 
ronment committees. For one series of ex- 
periments, payments were interdependent 
across two meetings. In general we found no 
evidence that controlled-environment com- 
mittees were capable of dealing systemati- 
cally with the system interdependencies. 
B. Responsiveness 
Since the committee decisions reflect 
primarily the consequences of default, they 
do not respond readily to changed economic 
conditions of individual carriers; indeed, 
they can be perverse. For example, if the 
profit position of a carrier increases, the 
optimum response in the committee can be 
to make concessions on marginal slots in 
order to "protect" its operations from a 
committee default. Thus, the firm would 
contract as it becomes relatively profitable 
rather than expand as it should. 
More importantly, carriers do not have an 
incentive to replace slots when they are 
"unneeded" because of short term, firm 
specific economics. Slots released and real- 
located through the committee become part 
of the "historical share" of another carrier 
and thereby affect all future decisions. Even 
when operations are not particularly profita- 
ble, firms have an incentive to keep them 
on. 
C. Susceptibility to Collusion 
Discussion of markets are strictly forbid- 
den during committee meetings. City-pairs, 
prices, profits, etc. cannot be discussed. Yet, 
because of the committee structure, each 
committee member has a type of control 
over competitors which is uncharacteristic 
of markets and inconsistent with the opera- 
tion of a freely competitive system. Firms 
can influence the market shares among its 
rivals while leaving its own constant. 
As an example of these considerations 
consider the statement of Delta, a carrier 
whose position at Washington National has 
been very stable and thus has "given up" 
nothing to those who are expanding: 
I've got some numbers I'd like to read 
off. Postmeeting January 1978, BN had 
20. Postmeeting June 1978, BN had 
20. Then 22, and after the meeting last 
summer, BN had 24. Now with four 
new carriers, BN asks for 4 more, all 
in overage hours. I don't know whether 
to say congratulations or shame. I 
don't intend to let BN get away with 
this. I've got people who ask me about 
slots not being used. I explain that it's 
a voluntary thing, in good will. But it's 
harder to explain why we don't get 
any. I can't explain how a carrier can 
go from 20 to 28 (emphasis added). 
[See our paper, Appendix C] 
This quotation from Delta is not atypical 
of concerns carriers articulate about the 
general slot distribution. Frequently during 
meetings carriers will say they will reduce 
requests only after "others" (often named) 
have done so. Sometimes they are very ex- 
plicit about who they feel should get what. 
D. Long-Run Growth 
With the committee process, the value of 
a slot does not serve as the means and the 
reward for creating additional airport capac- 
ity. Instead, the slot values are capitalized in 
the value of the recipient carrier companies. 
The committee allocation process will 
provide no stimulus at all for increasing 
airport capacity should the fiscal system fail 
to provide adequate funds. Or, if airport 
capacity is to be supplied in response to the 
economic demand for that capacity similar 
to the supply of other resources to the in- 
dustry, then the committee system cannot 
be an adequate mechanism. 
III. Recommendation 
The CAB should remove the antitrust ex- 
emption of the committees. In place of the 
committee, we recommend the FAA estab- 
lish or seek legislation which would enable 
the establishment of one-price sealed bid 
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auctions with aftermarkets. The timing of 
the auctions and the exact definition of a 
slot need further study. It may also be nec- 
essary to allow provisions for "contingent 
bids" to deal with possibly important com- 
plementarities and nonconvexities. Reve- 
nues from the auctions should be used to 
relax capacity constraints. However, the ex- 
act institutional method by which the latter, 
important recommendation can be imple- 
mented is left for further study. 
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